

6 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI *net* 25X1A9a

SUBJECT: Some Reflections on Inspection -- our Achilles Heel?

The following thoughts, which came to mind while I was working on our disarmament estimate, may be of interest.

1. We must lay more public stress on the problem of inspection. We have done a very poor job of justifying publicly this key aspect of our position. If we soon reach some broad agreement in principle on certain disarmament measures (e.g., test suspension), the question of reciprocal inspection will be on us full tilt. All Soviet specialists would probably be unanimous that the Soviets won't dream of accepting any such grandiose inspection plans as those prepared for Stassen or the test monitoring scheme in the recent Killian report. What worries me, for example, is that we will agree to test suspension if there is inspection, we will then reveal what we really mean by inspection, and the Soviets will scream to high heaven and accuse us of bad faith. They will succeed in making our demands appear so outrageous to public opinion everywhere (including the US) that we will lose most of the positive impact of having agreed to suspend tests.

2. Therefore, shouldn't we do more to lay the groundwork for justifying inspection per se, so as to offset this risk? First, since the disarmament issue is a key element in the East-West propaganda battle, we must demonstrate the reasonableness of our insistence on inspection to both our allies and the uncommitted world. DCI's remarks on the general subject of Soviet secretiveness in his Chamber of Commerce speech are very much to the point, and his challenge should be repeated -- ad nauseam if necessary -- from even higher levels. Can we not contrast more effectively the open nature of our system with the closed nature of the Bloc? This in itself is a powerful prima facie justification for inspection. But our few steps in this direction have been halting at best. Why don't we frankly pick up the Soviet jibes at inspection as "just a gigantic intelligence gathering scheme" and say "of course it is -- but it is forced on us by this Iron Curtain you maintain." Why don't we demonstrate how much defense data we make public, and ask the USSR repeatedly for similar details (are we afraid of the implication that our intelligence is no good)? Finally, can we

not turn around the Soviet argument that mutual confidence must first be achieved by saying that until it is achieved inspection is indispensable, and will even prove in time whether confidence is justified?

3. The second aim of public stress on inspection would be to chip away at Soviet reluctance; here I believe that use of intelligence could play a major role:

(a) There should be ways of getting across to the Soviets that we know a lot more than they might think (though I suspect they overestimate rather than underestimate us here) -- therefore why such stress on secrecy. We ought to use more widely the technique of announcing their nuclear explosions; why haven't we, in addition, said semi-officially that we know they have had a lot of abortive missile tests just like we have; in fact they tried just before May Day and flopped.

(b) A corollary would be to stress that with various technical developments now in sight even such secrecy as can now be maintained will become progressively harder. There might be real possibilities in this, and we know it must already worry them.

(c) Third, knowing how sensitive Moscow is, couldn't we do more to shame them into a more forthcoming attitude? Why should a superpower which is constantly proclaiming its accomplishments to the world cling to such conspiratorial habits? What have they got to hide? Is the USSR just one grand Potemkin village? I'll wager that a Khrushchev could be stung by skillful allegations along such lines.

4. The above points may all have been thought of before, and rejected with good reason. But it does seem to me that we are moving toward some agreements in principle with the Soviets which will, after arousing hopes, get bogged down in interminable arguments over inspection, for which we will take much of the blame. We must avoid this reaction if at all possible, and I think we can with foresight. Unless we can justify our stand on this issue, we may in time be pressured into accepting far less than desirable (though our present demands are far more than is realistic, to me.).

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*I have omitted the point that our terms on inspection will appear so high to the Soviets as to convince them we are not bargaining in good faith, i.e. are not really interested in mutual arms limitations.*

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